U.S. Supreme Court Dismisses Discrimination Suit Based on Twombly Pleading Standards
The United States Supreme Court recently decided Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). Expanding upon the Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 "plausibility standard" for pleadings set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), the opinion suggests that going forward, plaintiffs will need to possess a great amount of knowledge and detail about defendants' conduct before even filing a complaint. This may have the opposite effect of what Rule 8 was designed to do, i.e., "not to keep litigants out of court, but rather to keep them in," as Justices Stevens and Ginsburg dissented in Twombly.
In Ashcroft, the plaintiff was arrested in the wake of the September 11 attacks. Iqbal did not challenge his detention, but filed a discrimination suit alleging that while detained he was beaten and harassed solely on the basis of his race, religion, and national origin. He also claimed that highranking FBI and Department of Justice officials, though not personally involved in the beatings, were aware and approved of his treatment. The government moved to dismiss, maintaining that the plaintiff did not plead specific facts to state a claim. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue.
The Court discussed, reaffirmed, and arguably expanded upon the Rule 8 standards in Twombly, a class action antitrust case in which the plaintiffs alleged that various phone companies conspired to inflate charges and inhibit the growth of other providers in violation of the Sherman Act. The Court, adopting its own explanation for the pricing, namely "routine market conduct" held that plaintiffs' complaint fell short of the plausibility standard.
The Ashcroft majority affirmed dismissal of Iqbal's complaint. To pass muster under Twombly's plausibility standard, the plaintiff's complaint would have had to show without the aid of any discovery that the high-ranking government officials had "purposefully adopted a policy of classifying post-September 11 detainees as 'of high interest' because of their race, religion, or national origin." This begs the question whether the plausibility standard is even possible to meet, especially in discrimination cases where intent is a significant issue and courts are not bound to accept "legal conclusions" as true. Twombly, Ashcroft, and their progeny will no doubt result in an even steeper uphill battle for plaintiffs.
MA - SJC Says: Not Your Fireworks? Not Your Problem
It was July 4th, 1996, and the Berubes were having a party with 30 to 50 guests in attendance. Later in the evening, some unidentified guests began setting off Roman candles, bottle rockets, and M-80's. Some debris from the impromptu fireworks display hit Mr. Luoni in the eye, leaving him with a permanent vision impairment. He filed a negligence suit against his hosts, alleging that they should have controlled the dangerous actions of their guests. The case made its way up to the Supreme Judicial Court.
The Court determined that the Berubes were not liable because they did not provide the fireworks, did not control them, and did not create the dangerous situation. While landowners owe a duty to their guests to keep their premises in a reasonably safe condition, they "[do] not owe a duty to take affirmative steps to protect against dangerous or unlawful acts of third persons," unless a special relationship exists. The Court has held that such special relationships exist between hotels and their guests, colleges and their students, and bar owners and their patrons, but not between homeowners and their social guests.
The Court held that the hosts had "neither the means, nor the legal obligation, to supervise or prevent the discharge of the fireworks by others. Were the rule otherwise, injuries to guests at parties would lead to considerable litigation." The judgment for the homeowners was affirmed. Luoni v. Berube, 431 Mass. 729 (2000).
CT - Illegal Fireworks Display Is an Ultra hazardous Activity
The plaintiff was injured on the Fourth of July when he was struck in the forehead by debris from an illegal fireworks show on the defendants' property. He filed suit and alleged in count two of his complaint that the defendants were strictly liable for his injuries because an illegal fireworks display is an ultra hazardous activity. Defendants filed a motion to strike this count. The issue for the Court was whether, in Connecticut, an unlawful fireworks display is considered an abnormally dangerous activity for which the defendants were strictly liable.
To answer this question, the Court looked to the factors described in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which include the degree of risk, the likelihood that harm will result, whether the risk can be eliminated with reasonable care, how appropriate and common the activity is, and whether the activity's value outweighs its risk. The Court had no trouble finding that illegal fireworks, which are not protected by statutory safeguards, pose a high degree of risk and a high likelihood of injury, since "fireworks are, by definition, explosive devices" and "an unavoidable risk remains even in the case of a lawful fireworks display." The fact that such displays are common carried no weight with the Court. "It would be anomalous for the law to condone common illegal activity simply because it is common."
The Court found that the plaintiff had appropriately stated a strict liability claim and denied the defendants' motion to strike. Lipka v. DiLungo, 2000 WL 295355 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000).
